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This paper explores the consequences of the corporation income
tax when firms face financial constraints; that is, they are either
credit- or equity-rationed. (These financial constraints can, in turn,
be explained as the natural consequences of informational asym-
metries that are pervasive in the capital market.) The paper shows
that the effect of such taxes may be more related to average tax
rates than to the marginal effective tax rates on which recent lit-
erature, analyzing the incidence of such taxes in neoclassical firms,
has focused. For firms that are equity- (but not credit-) constrained,
the reduction in retained earnings reduces their willingness to un-
dertake risky investments, including R&D expenditures which en-
hance productivity in the long run. More generally, the impact of
the tax depends on the structure of taxes as much as it does on the
level (the provisions for tax deductibility of interest, the tax treatment
of capital gains, and so forth), and an analysis requires taking into
account the combined effects of the corporation and individual in-
come tax structures. For instance, for firms that are neither equity-
nor credit-constrained, the fact that interest payments are tax-
deductible implies that there are no marginal distortions with respect
to the level of investment. Higher differential taxes on equity may
induce some firms to decide not to issue equity. This financial de-
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1. Prelude
This paper is concemed with the impact of the corporation income tax
on a wide range of firm decisions, including its effect on output and on
investment in plant and equipment, in R&D, and in inventories.
Understanding the effect of a change in taxation requires understanding
the determinants of firm behavior. In recent years, we have been exploring
a theory of firm behavior that is an altemative to the standard neoclassical
model. This altemative theory is based on an explicit recognition of the
importance of financial constraints (what we call equity and credit rationing)
on firm behavior. Much of our work has been concemed with understanding
the sources of those financial constraints. This paper is concemed with
investigating the consequences of those constraints. We believe our model
of the financially constrained firm provides a much better description of firm
behavior than the altemative neoclassical theory, many of whose predictions
are simply inconsistent with observed behavior.
2. Introduction
Perhaps no question in public finance is so unsettled as the incidence
of the corporation tax. Yet few questions are of greater importance. For
instance, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 shifted some of the burden of taxation
($120 billion over five years) from the Individual Income Tax to the Cor-
poration Tax; whereas the provisions of the individual income tax were
designed to maintain distributional neutrality, the full distributional con-
sequences of the tax bill depend on who bears the burden of the increased
corporation tax. Until we answer that, we cannot tell whether the Tax Reform
Act was, overall, distributionally neutral, progressive, or regressive.
There are many reasons for the uncertainty about the incidence of the
corporation income tax, but among the more important reasons is the dif-
ferential treatment of debt and equity. Accordingly, how the firm finances
its investment makes a difference; but, at least until recently, our under-
standing of the determinants of firms' financial structures has remained, to
put it mildly, incomplete.
Fifteen years ago, Stiglitz (1973) showed that as long as firms could
finance their investment at the margin by debt, since interest on debt was
tax-deductible, the corporation tax was nondistortionary. That is, in the
absence of taxation, the firm set the level of investment so that the value
of the marginal product of capital (MPK) equaled the user cost, the rate of
interest, T, plus the depreciation rate 8:
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MPK = T + b. (1)
The firm does exactly the same thing with taxation.'
This view implies that the corporation income tax is not, in effect, a
tax on capital, at least at the margin. What, then, is the corporation income
tax? Stiglitz suggested that it was an infra-marginal tax on the retum to
capital, a tax on the original equity investors in the firm; since these were,
at least in many cases, the original entrepreneurs, the tax could be thought
of as largely a tax on entrepreneurship. If this view were accepted, it would
have strong implications for the consequences of the tax. It might serve to
depress the long-run growth of the economy, and whether labor or capital
bore the brunt of the tax would depend on the effect that entrepreneurship
had on the relative retums to these two factors.^
In spite of the seeming persuasiveness of the arguments, this view has
not been widely adopted, for instance, in the empirical studies of the in-
cidence of the corporation and capital taxation of Auerbach (1983), Fullerton
and King (1984), or Shoven and his co-authors (for instance, Shoven
[1976]). These authors, while recognizing that the marginal financial struc-
ture need not equal the average, have tended to assume either that marginal
investments are financed by a ratio of debt to equity reflecting the firm's
current debt-equity ratio or that in fact marginal investments are financed
out of equity.
Although they have not articulated clearly their objections to Stiglitz's
earlier analysis, there seem to be three concems:
1. Stiglitz incorrectly calculated the cost of borrowing: As firms borrow
more, the interest rate they must pay increases, and this discourages
them from borrowing. Accordingly, they use equity to finance their
marginal investments.
2. There are other costs to borrowing (other than the increases in interest
rates paid) and these too induce the use of equity at the margin.
1. This is true as long as the corporation income tax is proportional with hili loss offsets. Auerbach
and Poterba (1987) have argued persuasively that limitations on loss deductibility. even with current
provisions for carry forward and cany back, may have significant effects. It also a^umes that depreciation
allowances equal true economic depreciation. The effects of accelerated depreciation are by now rea-
sonably well understood. Accordingly, to isolate the effects we are interested in in this paper, we assume
full toss offsets and true economic depreciation.
2. Thus, if entrepreneurship is thought of as increasing the productivity of capital and labor, it
would depend both on the elasticity of substitution hetween capital and labor and on the extent to which
entrepreneurship was "capital" versus "labor" augmenting. Of course, if the long mn supply curve
of capital is perfectly elastic (as it would presumably be either in a small open economy or with the
standard utility functions with constant discount factors), then the long-run burden of the tax must be
on the remaining factors—labor and entrepreneurship.
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3. Firms are constrained in the amount they can borrow, and hence
they must use equity.'
We will argue in this paper that although the criticisms of Stiglitz's
paper are partially (but only partially) correct, the incidence of the corpo-
ration t£ix is in fact markedly different from that implied by currently fash-
ionable models.
In particular, we will show the following:
!. Even if the interest rate charged increases with the amount borrowed,
taxation may leave unaffected the basic equation describing the opi-
tima! amount of borrowing; but whether taxation affects the amount
of borrowing and the level of investment depends critically on
whether firms are constrained in the amount of equity they can issue.
2. Stiglitz (1973) argued that different firms would be in different re-
gimes. Firms would first finance investments out of retained eamings.
Only if retained eamings were insufficient would they borrow ad-
ditional funds. Even for firms for which retained eamings exceeds
investment, however, equation (1) (or the analogue, where the in-
terest rate charged increases with the amount borrowed) would still
hold, as long as firms used retained eamings not invested in capital
goods to retire debt. If firms were constrained in the amount they
could borrow (new firms) or lend (tax laws adversely treat investment
holding companies), then equation (1) would not hold; for these
firms, a separate calculation of the effect of taxation on investment
must be made.
Firm behavior in Stiglitz's model was driven by tax considerations and
arbitrarily specified financial constraints. Here, we discuss how those con-
straints can be derived from underlying considerations of imperfect infor-
mation. The results thus derived, however, are similar to those obtained by
Stiglitz in his original analysis.
3. In particular, for firms that are both equity- and credit-constrained,
average tax rates are critical in determining the incidence of taxation,
not the conventionally calculated marginal tax rate; for firms that are
equity-constrained but not credit-constrained, the corporation tax is
nondistortionary if the only costs associated with additional borrow-
ing are the increased interest rate they must pay, but not if there are
other costs; but for firms that choose to enter the equity market (a
decision that can be modeled endogenously), the corporation tax
3. Stiglitz (1973) briefly considered this possibility.
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discourages investment, but by an amount that is greater than that
suggested by the conventional effective marginal tax analysis.
3. A Simple Heuristic Model
In this section we consider a simple mode! of the corporate sector, in
which there is a representative firm attempting to make investment and
financia! decisions in the interests of current shareholders. Capital markets
are perfect, in the sense that the firm can borrow at a rate of interest reflecting
its true bankruptcy probability. The rate of interest charged will, of course,
increase as it borrows more, since that will normally increase the likelihood
of a default. There is a tax rate of T on corporations, of / on interest payments
to individuals, and of r, on distributions to equity owners. Interest on debt
is, however, deductible by the firm. For simplicity, we use a two-period
model, and in this section we focus only on the consequences of borrowing
and investment decisions for the second period.
Firms are assumed to have a retum of 6 from previous investments;
current investments K yield a retum of eQ{K) where e is a random variable
with mean 1 and finite variance. Investment can be financed either by
retained eamings R or by borrowing B or by issuing new equity E. Thus,
by assumption
K = R -t- B -\- E. (2)
For simplicity, we assume that there cannot be negative equity issues,
that retained eamings not invested in capita! can be lent out at a safe interest
rate of p, and that there is no preexisting debt."
3.1 Risk Neutrality
We begin our analysis by assuming that all individuals are risk-neutral.
Investors will insist on the same after-tax retum to equities as on bonds.
Thus, denoting by p, the before-tax retum on equities, we have
(1 - rjp, = (1 - Op
or
4. These assumptions allow us to focus on the consequences of the financial and investment
decisions on the final period.
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P. = I _ I • ( 3 )
Given our risk-neutrality assumption, then, in the absence of any bank-
mptcy costs, it can be shown that the expected retum to current shareholders
is=
(1 - 7)8 + (1 - T) (,Q{K) - pB) - p^ (4)
where f is the effective tax rate on the retum on earlier investments,'' K is
given by equation (2), where we assume R is fixed. The firm chooses B and
E to maximize its expected retum; that is, for an interior solution'
Q' = P (5a)
and
(1 - T)G' = p,. (5b)
We have thus reestablished, in somewhat more general terms, the result
of Stiglitz (1973) that the basic formula for equilibrium investment is un-
affected by the corporation income tax. This result holds even when there
is a finite probability of bankruptcy, so that the nominal interest rate charged,
r exceeds p and increases with B. The reason for this is obvious: As long
as investors and firms have the same expectations about the distribution of
retums, lenders will insist on receiving an interest rate that is high enough
to generate an expected retum p. Hence, it is only this retum that is of
relevance, not the nominal (promised) retum r .^
On the other hand, substituing equation (3) into (5b), we obtain
Q' = Jip i5b')
where
5. The actual retum to shareholders is 0 if the firm goes bankrupt, and Q(,K) - (1 + r^)B if it
does not. where r^ is the nominal (promised) interest payment on a loan, r, is set so that the expected
payment, per dollar lent, to bondholders (who receive r^ if the firm does not go bankrupt, and if
B
it does) is just p. After some manipulation, it can be shown that;
E{max{O.Q(K) - (1 + ro)B}} = Q(,K) - pB
when r, is determined in the trunner described. This, of course, assumes that "bankruptcy" costs arc
zero, but a similar result applies as long as bankruptcy costs can be fully offset against corporate taxes.
6. T may differ from T because of capital gains tax treatment (under the pre-1986 tax law).
7. There are problems with the definitions of p. po, p^. etc. If these are interpreted as rates of
interest, then implicitly we are assuming that capital does not depreciate. With depreciation, the first-
order condition on capital investment, equation (5a), becomes:
(1 - 8) + Q'm = 1 + p (5'a)
which reduces to (5.a) only if 8 = 0. Similarjy for other equations.
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represents the relative tax advantage of debt over equity. It is thus apparent
that we cannot be interior in both B and E; at least one of the two equations
must be replaced by an inequality. In particular, it is not difficult to see
that if





debt financing is preferable; E will be set equal to zero. More accurately,
the firm will finance its investment first out of retained eamings, and the
remainder by borrowing. (If retained eamings exceed investment, then the
residue is lent at the retum p.)" If (7) is satisfied, investment is given by
(5.a), or inverting:
8. If negative equity issues are allowed, then whether such issues are desirable depends on their
tax treatment. Share repurchases entail a tax in the first period. Thus, repurchasing a dollar of equity,
financed by borrowing, engenders a cunent tax liability of f,. The corporation's tax liability next period
is reduced by Tp. ignoring certain technicalities associated with default. Individuals' interest receipts
after tax are increased by (1 — r)p; equity receipts are reduced by (1 — O (1 ~ T)p. Thus, net re-
ceipts are increased by p[(l - r) - (1 - r,) (1 - T)]. If individuals' marginal rate of substitution is
equal to
p(l - 0
then the refinancing becomes desirable if and only if
1 - (I/ft) a i.
r, + T - r - r,T > f, (1 - r).
For a security whose basis is close to zero, f, is approximately equal to t,. Under current legislation,
with full taxation of capital gains, this reduces to
The refinancing is desirable, but only marginally so. If capital gains are taxed at the ordinary rate, then
refinancing becomes desirable if the corporate rate exceeds the individual rate. Note that if the individual
plans to die. then f, can be much greater than t,, and refinancing becomes clearly undesirable. If. for
instance, r, •= 0, r = f,. then refinancing becomes desirable only if
1 - T £ (I - if.
With r = .34, t = .28, the condition is not satisfied (.66 a .5184 = (.72)^).
The importance of these tax costs of refinancing have been stressed in Stigiitz (1988).
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K = Q'-' (p). (8)
If retums are distributed to equity owners subject to full taxation, con-
dition (7) will always be satisfied. With favorable treatment of capital gains,
it may not be. Assume that equity distributions escape taxation completely.
Then the condition becomes simply
t < T.
Those with tax rates below the corporate rate prefer all debt financing
(at the margin); those with tax rates in excess of the corporate tax rate prefer
equity financing. Prior to 1981, there were some individuals for whom equity
financing was clearly superior; from 1981 to 1986, most investors were
almost indifferent; under the new tax bill, with full taxation of capital gains,
there should be a stronger preference for debt.
3.2. Risk Aversion
The analysis is not much changed in the presence of risk aversion. For
simplicity, we assume a representative individual. For him (or her) to be
willing to hold both debt and equity, the risk equity must give a higher
retum. We thus assume that the mean required retum on equity p^* is given





if individuals are risk averse. ' ' 7 — 1 represents the risk premium on the
risky equity. If we assume that the risk premium is relatively unaffected by
9. We can derive y and its properties from the representaive individual's utility function. If U is
the individual's utility function and p is the random return on equity, then the absence of taxation
EU' (p - p) = 0
or
EU' p
With taxation, we have
EU' = P
EU'p _ p(l - r)
EU' " 1 - (, •
This equation can be thought of as defining either the price of equity or the mean required retum on
equity p*,.
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the actions of the firm, then the earlier analysis with risk-neutral shareholders
remains applicable with only trivial modifications.'" But the assumption of
a constant 7 is not plausible. More generally, 7 will be a function of both
the level of debt and investment (which together imply a particular level of
equity). We postulate that an increase in debt (keeping the amount of equity
fixed) increases the required retum (risk premium) on equity:
An increase in E, keeping K constant (that is, substituting equity for debt)
lowers the risk premium required:
For simplicity, we assume the firm still maximizes (4), but it recognizes
that its financial policy has an effect on the cost of raising funds." We
obtain as our first-order conditions for E and K:'^
and (for an interior solution)
or
(15.)
Two important results emerge from (14) and (15). First, taxes affect
only the equilibrium conditions to the extent they affect (Ji, the bias of the
10. In particular, our earlier result that finns will either wish to invest entirely in equity or debt
will continue to hold.
11. This objective function can be motivated by assuming that the controlling shareholders are
wealthy and act in a risk-neutral manner. We also assume here no bankruptcy costs. For a discussion
of what we view to be the more plausible case of risk-averse firm behavior, see Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1989).
12. Substituting equation (10) into (4) and reananging. we obtain the resuh that firms seek to
maximize (with respect to K and E)
(1 - f)e + (1 - T) le(Ar) - (>(K - R - E)
where now retained eamings depend on taxes.
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tax structure for debt. Second, issuing more debt does have a cost when
firms are issuing equity beyond the increased interest rate that must be paid.
Firms will take this into account, and this will reduce their level of invest-
ment, below the level at which the value of marginal product equals (p),
i.e.,^<e'-'(p).
Moreover, we now may obtain an interior solution for the debt-equity
ratio, for as firms substitute debt for equity, the marginal cost of an increase
in debt (from additional substitution of debt for equity) increases.
There thus may exist some firms that, as before, issue no equity, and
for which the equations (and inequalities) describing the equilibrium remain
unchanged. But there may exist other firms with E greater than zero; for
these firms, an increase in B has an indirect cost in terms of an increased
cost of equity.
Though the equilibrium conditions as we wrote them in (14) and (15)
reflect the tax structure only through the parameter (ji, there is a hidden
direct effect of tax structure. Taxes affect R, the supply of funds available
for reinvestment. Thus, at a fixed value of K and E, B must increase; but
then, under reasonable conditions, the marginal cost of debt will increase.
Hence, the LHS of (14) exceeds the right. The firm responds by cutting
back investment."
The effect of a change in the tax structure is captured in this model
through the parameter ix.'" Totally differentiating equations (14) and (15)
with respect to J^L, we can solve for the effect of a change in ix. on both the
level of equity and, at any given level of equity, on the level of investment.
It appears plausible that an increase in jji, which measures the relative
attractiveness of debt, will result in a decrease in E; debt will be substituted
for equity. From (14), then, there are three effects associated with the
increase in |x. First, there is a direct effect (the RHS of (14) is increased),
which discourages investment. Second, there is the indirect effect on the
marginal increase in the risk premium from an increase in debt; since equity
has been reduced, the risk premium (at any given B) is higher, and it is
plausible to assume that, correspondingly, the marginal effect of an increase
in debt is larger. This too serves to reduce investment. Finally, there is the
direct effect of the decrease in £, which serves to increase investment. For
firms issuing almost no equity, then, the third effect dominates, and the
13. See footnote below for a full calculation. In Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989), we explicitly
derive the increase in the marginal cost of debt, relating it to bankruptcy costs. In that paper, we assume
bondholders are risk-neutral and have rational expectations conceming default.
14. Though taxes could have a direct effect on 7 as well; this would be the case, for instance, if
attitudes toward risk depended on wealth, and the tax had a significant effect on wealth. In the subsequent
'discussion, we ignore this direct effect.
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change in tax stmcture represented by an increase in \i leads to an increase
in investment. But for most firms, we would expect the first two effects to
dominate, and hence an increase in JJL—the tax preference for debt—to reduce
investment. '^
In short, when the effects of tax structure on financial structure and of
financia! structure on investment are taken into account, then the corporate
income tax appears to be more than just an infra-marginal tax. What is
relevant is not so much marginal tax rates, but the tax stmcture, summarized
15. Totally differentiating (14) and (15), we obtain
The second-order conditions ensure that
and
We assutne further that















" ^ aF T a ^ ^ ^TE) -\SB^ '^dBdEJ •
If the cross term is small, we would expect this condition to be sEUi
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in the parameter ft and the effect of taxes on R, which is related to the
average tax rate. Normally, investment will be discouraged when |x is
increased (though for some firms with small equity bases, just the opposite
may happen); and to the extent that investment is reduced, real wages are
(at least in the long mn) likely to be lower. The tax will be bome at least
partly by ^
3.3 Risk-Averse Firms
These results are reinforced if the firm is risk-averse. The reduction in
retained earnings means that at any value of {K, E} borrowing must be
greater, so the risk of bankruptcy is greater. Hence K will be reduced even
more than our earlier calculation suggests.
Furthermore, if firms are equity-constrained (Greenwald, Stiglitz, and
Weiss [1984]), the bankmptcy effects will be particularly strong, since the
only way to raise capital is to borrow (Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989]).
This analysis is intended to be heuristic, and a careful reader will im-
mediately object: We have ignored the basic lesson of the Modigliani-Miller
theorem. A change in the debt-equity ratio does not necessarily entail a
change in the risk premium. But there is an objection to that objection; the
Modigliani-Miller theorem holds only in the absence of bankmptcy and
with perfect information. Financial structure is important precisely because
of bankruptcy and imperfect information.
Still, more broadly, one of the lessons to emerge from the capital asset
pricing literature is that what is relevant for assessing the riskiness of an
asset is not variance, but correlation with the market; increasing the prob-
ability of default increases the "riskiness" of equity only to the extent that
those bankmptcy probabilities are correlated with the business cycle.
In fact, of course, when businessmen use the term riskiness in judging
altemative courses of actions, they are concemed with bankmptcy, whether
or not those bankmptcy probabilities are correlated with the business cycle.
The reason for this is that they bear undiversifiable risks associated with
bankruptcy, and their concem is likely to be reflected in the actions firms
take.
Thus, the reason firms are averse to undertaking actions that significantly
increase their bankmptcy probability is not only that doing so would increase
the cost of raising equity and the interest rates they pay on debt, but also
that such actions increase the risks they face. If this is so, taxation will have
16. This assumes that, at least in the long run, p remains unchanged.
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effects on firm borrowing and investment, even—and particularly when—
firms do not issue equity.
In Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989) we extend the Greenwald-Stiglitz-
Weiss (1984) model of the corporate financial stmcture based on informa-
tional asymmetries to analyze the effects of the corporation income tax on
investment.
We categorize firms into three categories:"
1. Those that are both equity- and credit-constrained. These firms' in-
vestment is limited by the availability of funds. The only aspect of
the tax code that matters for these firms is the average tax rate.
Increases in the average tax rate get reflected directly in reductions
in the level of investment.
2. Those that are equity-constrained but not credit-constrained. For
these firms, marginal investments are financed by borrowing, which
is tax-deductible. Thus, since the retums to investing are reduced in
proportion to the costs, the major effect is the increased risk—the
increased probability of bankmptcy associated with any level of
investment—as firms must borrow more to maintain the same level
of investment when retained eamings are reduced.
For these firms, again, it is the average tax rate that matters.
3. Those that issue equity. For these firms, the average tax rate effect
discussed in connection with equity-constrained firms remains valid,
but possibly with somewhat less force, as new equity issues can
partially offset this effect. Whether firms will wish to issue more—
or less—equity depends in part on how the tax stmcture changes.
4. Other Consequence of the Asymmetry of Information
The principal consequence of the asymmetries of information on which
we have focused in this paper is that funds do not flow freely, either among
firms or between firms and households, as they do in the standard neoclass-
ical model. Our tax system also serves to impose barriers on the flow of
funds. It is on the interaction of these two barriers that we have particularly
focused our attention.
In this section we briefly take up two other sets of consequences.
17. There is a fourth possible category—those that are credit-constrained but not equity-con-
strained. For reasons explained in Greenwald-Stiglitz—Weiss, not too much importance is attached to
this category. For these firms, the earlier analyses assuming all marginal investment is equity-financed
is appropriate; and marginal tax rates become more important than average tax rates.
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The Dividend Paradox
The first is a comment on the long-standing dividend paradox. Assume
that some firm has eamed an extraordinary retum. If the firm distributes
those funds to the shareholders, a tax is imposed on the transfer. Moreover,
further costs are impnased on the manager if he wishes to recover these funds
from the household sector. Thus, there are, in effect, heavy penalties from
transferring funds out of the firm, when subsequently funds are to be trans-
ferred back into the firm. But limited managerial capacities may imply that
the best management of those funds does not entail having those funds
invested in "real" investment in the firm. The (temporary) transfer of
resources to other firms, through the purchase of equity, may be desirable.
But then, when that firm distributes funds to its owners, dividends receive
preferable treatment compared to capital gains. Thus, consider a wealthy
owner of a firm, who does not want the capital today, but rather wishes to
leave a bequest to his children. If the funds were redistributed to him, he
would have invested them in firm X. If firm X were regularly buying back
shares, the retums would compound at the rate (1 — t^) times the retum,
say L,. Thus, a distribution today would yield in Z years (1 — r,)e'" ^ ''•'^ .
If the funds are retained inside the firm and the firm in which the funds
were invested distributed its retums as dividends, he would have ^{S5<I-T)Z
If the funds were retained inside the firm and the firm in which the funds
were invested distributed its retums in the form of capital gains (share
repurchases), he would have at the end e*'"'''^ .^ Clearly, for reasonable
values of the parameters, it pays to retain, and to have the firm in which
the funds are invested distribute its retums by means of dividends. A firm
concemed with maximizing its stock market value (either today or tomorrow)
in deciding whether to increase dividends and reduce share repurchases
would balance out the decreased valuation on the part of individual share-
holders with the increased valuation on the part of corf)orations.
This explanation, although suggestive, suffers from one major problem:
Firms should be able to constmct specialized financial instmments, tailored
for different clientele. Thus, the firm could issue two classes of shares, M
and N; retums to shares M would be in the form of dividends, those to
shares N in the form of share repurchases. To some extent firms can do
this, for example, with preferred shares. The problem is that were the two
categories of shares' retums explicitly linked, the common shares might not
receive the favorable treatment of share repurchases normally afforded; and
if they are not explicitly linked, they will have different risk characteristics
or there will be an obvious opportunity for one class of claimants to take
advantage of another.
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Choice of Technique
We have liniited our attention here to the effect of taxation on the form
of financing and the level of investment. Taxation has other effects, for
instance, on the level of risk taking, the extent of credit rationing, and
interest rates charged for loans. Consider, for instance, the Stiglitz-Weiss
credit rationing with collateral model (1986, 1987), and assume that losses
are not fully deductible. It can be shown that taxes will induce less risk
taking (at any given interest rate-collateral combination); the reduced risk
taking may result in banks' charging higher rates of interest. That is, if there
are two projects, the critical rate of interest (above which individuals switch
to the risky project) is increased. This increase in the rate of interest charged
will, in tum, have further ramifications for the level of investment.
5. Concluding Comments
Popular discussions, in assessing the effects of the corporation tax and
its faimess, have focused on average tax rates. In recent years it has become
fashionable for economists to look down on these naive views, arguing that
what is relevant is marginal tax rates. They have interpreted the goal of
making a "level playing field" to imply making sure that all investments
are taxed at the same marginal rate, regardless of what average tax rates
may be.
Our analysis should at least cast some skepticism conceming this view.
Our analysis has two parts: First, we argued that, as long as interest payments
were tax-deductible and firms couid finance their marginal investments
through debt, marginal tax rates that did not distort the relative tax burden
of debt and equity had no direct effect on investment. Earlier analyses
focusing on the effect of marginal tax rates simply made some ad hoc (and
probably incorrect) assumption, such that the marginal debt-equity ratio
equaled the average debt-equity ratio, or that new investment was financed,
at the margin, entirely by equity.
If it is argued that firms do not finance their marginal investments by
borrowing, one must have an explanation for why that is so. Any coherent
theory of the incidence of the corporation income tax must be based, then,
on a model of the determinants of a firm's financial stmcture, and an ex-
planation of how taxes affect financial stmcture.
The second part of our analysis was accordingly devoted to presenting
a simple heuristic model, in which risk aversion plays an important role.
Debt and equity are different, in part at least because of the risks they impose
on the firm (there is no bankmptcy probability with equity) and the con-
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sequent incentives to which they give rise. Under the plausible assumption
that an increase in indebtedness increases the risk premium required for
investment, we are able to show that increases in the average tax rate
discourage investment; and it is only the average tax rate that matters. As
long as there is no change in tax stmcture, that is the relative preference
for debt versus equity.
More generally, we have argued that as long as firms are either equity-
or credit-constrained, average tax rates will be important. The magnitude
of the effect of the tax will depend precisely on the nature of the constraints
facing firms. Since these financial constraints are likely to be particularly
important for new, entrepreneurial firms, the concern'* that the corporation
tax discourages entrepreneurship may be well founded.
Appendix A
Finite Bankruptcy Costs and Loss Offset Provisions
The firm maximizes
(1 - T)e + (1 - T) {Q(^K) - p") - p ^ - (1 - T)TrB • c (A.I)
where TTB is a function of 6; B, K, and p*^  the rate of interest promised on
debt. In particular, bankmptcy occurs when
e + eQ{K)s p B ' or e < ~ ~ -
Let Fie) be the distribution function of €. Then
Now consider the first-order condition,
(1 - T) [Q'(K) - p] - (I - T ) c ^ = 0
or
f/dK(1 - T) IQ'iK) - p] - (! - T)C/'
9'B -




18. Expressed, for instance, in Stiglitz's earlier paper (1973).
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Thus, the first-order condition with a finite "cost of bankmptcy" that can
be offset against taxes is unaffected by the tax rate.
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